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SECURE MY DATA OR PAY THE PRICE:
CONSUMER REMEDY FOR THE NEGLIGENT
ENABLEMENT OF DATA BREACH
ABSTRACT
Every time we swipe our debit cards, pay our bills online, or sign up
for a service like Netflix, we are entrusting important identifying information to the companies with which we do business. Most of the time, those
companies take seriously the obligation to protect our data and prevent it
from falling into the hands of those who would use it to benefit themselves
at our expense. Some companies, however, fail to do enough to meet that
burden, making it easier for identity thieves to inflict personal and financial injury on consumers. To date, our legal system has essentially denied
consumers a remedy against these negligent businesses.
This Note seeks to explore the problem of data breach and offer solutions for both improving electronic data security and establishing a remedy for consumers. To elaborate on this problem, this Note examines two
high-profile data breaches: the famous “TJX breach” and the more recent
breaches suffered by the Sony Corporation. In both of these cases, millions of customers had their data exposed as a result of a failure to implement basic security protocols or update existing security models to incorporate advances in technology.
This Note will (1) examine the problem of data breach; (2) articulate
means of establishing security standards for businesses; (3) argue for federal codification and regulation of those standards; and (4) argue that consumers should be empowered with a negligence cause of action, grounded
in the theory of negligence per se, to hold businesses to those standards.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumers today entrust more data than ever before to the companies
and organizations with which they do business. Credit card numbers, Social
Security numbers, bank account information, and numerous other forms of
personal and financial information are all entrusted to businesses during
the course of the enormous number of transactions that occur each day.
Often this information is stored on company servers, either as a courtesy
to the customer or as a requirement of establishing a business relationship
in anticipation of future transactions. Naturally, these databases of sensitive customer information present an attractive target to computer hackers.
Often these hackers seek to steal the identities of consumers in order to
engage in fraudulent transactions in their names. Increasingly, however,
“hacktivists” seek to expose consumer data to get a business’s attention,
either to promote a particular cause, or to point out how vulnerable a particular business’s network is to these kinds of cyber-attacks.1 From a consumer’s point of view, distinguishing between the identity thief and the
hacktivist is virtually impossible, as once their data is exposed, identity
theft is a concern regardless of the stated aim of the attackers.
In response, most companies seek to secure their networks that store
vital consumer information through various means of electronic defenses
such as firewalls, intrusion detection protocols, and authentication requirements.2 In some cases, however, companies fail to take adequate
steps to secure their customer data and their networks are breached, resulting in exposure of that data to those who gained access.3 It is at this point,
of “data breach” but no actual identity theft (i.e., fraudulent transactions),
that consumers have suffered an injury for which our current legal system
has, to date, denied them a remedy.4

1

See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Discover Site Security Measures, DISCOVER BANK, https://www.discover
.com/credit-cards/member-benefits/security/online-safety/discover-site.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013) (indicating that the Discover website utilizes “128-bit Secure Socket Layer
(SSL)” encryption which “encodes information sent over the Internet” along with username and password requirements, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems).
3
See, e.g., Raj Chaudhary et al., Have You Conducted a Data Protection Audit Lately?,
INTERNAL AUDITOR (Sept. 2011), http://www.theiia.org/intAuditor/feature-articles/2011
/august/have-you-conducted-a-data-protection-audit-lately/.
4
See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned Hand’s Negligence
Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 ISJLP 237, 264 (2007) [hereinafter Rustad
& Koenig, Extending] (“No plaintiff has been successful in receiving an award to
compensate for lost data where identity theft has not yet occurred.”).
2
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This Note argues that consumers should have a negligence cause of action in cases of data breach.5 This cause of action should be grounded in a
negligence per se theory based on federal codification of network security
standards.6 Part I will further elaborate the problem consumers and businesses face, focusing on the recent breaches Sony Corporation and its customers suffered related to its popular “PlayStation 3” entertainment system,
along with the widely discussed case of In re TJX Companies Retail Security
Breach Litigation.7 Part II will highlight the fact that there is virtually no
mandatory regulation of corporate network security in place today, discuss
organizations that could serve as the source of standards for adequate network security, and argue that federal regulations should refer to or build
upon those standards. Part III will discuss the traditional five elements of a
negligence action: duty, breach, causation, harm, and damages. The negligence action available to consumers should be constructed along the lines
of Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig’s “negligent enablement of cybercrime,”8 however it should be grounded in a negligence per
se theory, calling upon the federal regulations discussed in Part II to establish a business’s duty of care. This negligence action could be labeled
“negligent enablement of data breach” and should incorporate Rustad and
Koenig’s toxic tort approach to data breach cases.9 This approach would
allow consumers to overcome the traditional hurdle they have faced in the
courts—proving that they have actually suffered harm when no fraudulent
transactions have been made with their information.10 Part IV of this Note
will conclude, offering caution that this problem needs to be addressed sooner
rather than later, with the increasing prevalence of “cloud-computing.”11
5

See id. at 237; see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent
Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1553 (2005) [hereinafter Rustad
& Koenig, The Tort].
6
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining negligence per se as “negligence
established as a matter of law, so that the breach of the duty is not a jury question. Negligence
per se usu[ally] arises from a statutory violation.”).
7
See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 489 (1st Cir. 2009), amended
on reh’g in part (D. Mass. 2009); PSN News: Consumer Reports, PLAYSTATION, http://us
.playstation.com/news/consumeralerts/#us (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
8
See generally Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5.
9
See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264–66.
10
Id. at 266–70.
11
See IDC Predicts 2012 Will Be the Year of Mobile and Cloud Platform Wars as IT
Vendors Vie for Leadership While the Industry Refines Itself, INT’L DATA CORP. (Dec. 1,
2011), http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS23177411 (predicting that spending
on “mobile computing, cloud services, social networking, and big data analytics technologies” would “account for at least 80% of IT spending growth between now and 2020”).
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I. THE PROBLEM OF DATA BREACH
A. Elaboration of the Problem
Data breach and the attendant risk of identity theft affect millions of
Americans each year.12 In 2011, there were 419 incidents of reported data
breach resulting in the potential exposure of almost 23 million confidential records.13
Many of these reported data breaches are incidents of physical theft,
such as the theft of a whole computer or its hard drive, or other physical
data storage devices such as the ubiquitous “thumb drive.”14 Some of these
data breaches are the result of negligent posting of private information onto
publicly accessible areas of an organization’s network.15 However, the
most problematic incidents of data breach are often a result of unauthorized
intrusion into a business or other organization’s data systems by cyberattackers, more commonly known as hackers.16 In fact, hacking is increasingly seen not only as a way to steal funds or information with which to
make fraudulent transactions, but also as a way of forcing a business to
12

Jacob W. Schneider, Note, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches to
Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 281–82
(2009) (“In recent years, the risk of identity theft has grown annually at a rapid rate.
Between 2003 and 2006, the United States saw a fifty percent increase in the number of
identity theft victims. Today, identity theft affects about fifteen million Americans each
year.” (footnotes omitted)).
13
2011 ITRC Breach Report, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www
.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Report_2011_20120207.pdf.
14
For example, a drive containing over 63,000 personal records was stolen from the
vehicle of “an employee of Neurological Institute of Savannah & Center for Spine.” Id. at 14.
15
See id. at 29 (“Yale University has notified about 43,000 faculty, staff, students and
alumni that their names and Social Security numbers were publicly available via Google
search for about 10 months.”). The data breach at Yale was evidently the result of the
decision to store unencrypted personal information on a publicly accessible FTP (File
Transfer Protocol) server that Google’s automated processes eventually accessed and
incorporated into their search results. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Yale Warns 43,000 About
10-Month-Long Data Breach, COMPUTERWORLD (August 22, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://
www.computerworld.com/s/article/9219369/Yale_warns_43_000_about_10_month_long
_data_breach.
16
See 2011 ITRC Breach Report Key Findings, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/headlines/Breaches_2011.shtml (accessed by searching the Internet Archive index) (noting that “[h]acking attacks were
responsible for more than one-quarter (25.8%)” of 2011 data breaches, “hitting a fiveyear all time high”) (footnote omitted); see also 2011 ITRC Breach Report, IDENTITY
THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 13, at 20 (“Betfair says cyberattackers likely gained access
to the credit and debit details affiliated with 2.3 million customers.”) (emphasis added).
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take notice of your cause.17 From a consumer point of view, however, distinguishing between hacktivists and other hackers who intend to access
consumer personal information for their own gain is virtually impossible,
and largely academic. Once their information is exposed, the threat of subsequent identity theft, whether by a rogue member of a hacktivist group or
by a hacker whose goal was theft all along, hangs over the heads of all data
breach victims.
B. High Profile Examples of Data Breach: Sony PlayStation and TJX
All of the above types of data breach are troubling, not only because of
the sheer volume of sensitive personal information exposed, but also because
of the fact that such incidents could often have been ameliorated or even
entirely avoided by employing a minimal amount of modern information security practices.18 Two stark examples of such failures are the events leading
to the oft-discussed case of In re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach
Litigation19 and the more recent attack on Sony Corporation’s “PlayStation
Network,” serving its popular “PlayStation 3” entertainment system.20
The facts of TJX represent the worst-case scenario for data breach. Beginning in 2005 and continuing for 18 months, hackers went undetected as
they accessed TJX’s databases, exposing “at least 45 million credit and
debit cards to potential fraud.”21 It was eventually discovered that the hackers
gained access to TJX’s systems by intercepting a retail store’s wireless communications containing information that allowed the hackers to gain access
to TJX’s central database.22 These hackers were able to accomplish this
intrusion with relative ease, due to the fact that TJX was using an outdated
17

See Ravi Somaiya & Steve Lohr, Arrest Puts Spotlight on Brazen Hacking Group
LulzSec, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/technology
/24hack.html (“[T]he actions of LulzSec fall broadly into the category known as
hacktivism. Hackers of this type are not motivated by money, but are mainly interested in
protesting against or antagonizing their targets .... Hacktivists tend to portray their
activities as digital sit-ins, a form of protest.”).
18
See Vijayan, supra note 15. Had Yale at least encrypted the data stored on their
publicly accessible server, even though the files would have still been downloadable by
outsiders, they would have been much harder to actually open and read.
19
In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 489 (1st Cir. 2009), amended
on reh’g in part (May 5, 2009).
20
See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7.
21
Mark Jewell, Encryption Faulted in TJX Hacking, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 25, 2007),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20979359/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/encryption
-faulted-tjx-hacking/#.Tqxz2kMg_m0.
22
Joseph Pereira, Breaking the Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless
Door, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2007, at A1.
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form of wireless security23 and had failed to take additional security
measures, such as the installation of firewalls.24 In fact, the hackers “were
so confident of being undetected that they left encrypted messages to each
other on the company’s network, to tell one another which files had already been copied and avoid duplicating work.”25 For consumers however,
the problems went beyond the mere theft of their confidential and personal
data. It eventually became known that the hackers were selling consumer
financial data to gangs of thieves, who used that information to make
fraudulent purchases.26
More recently, in the summer of 2011, Sony Corporation and many of
its subsidiaries were the targets of numerous hacking incidents.27 Most
notably, hackers brought down the online component of Sony’s popular
PlayStation 3 entertainment console for approximately one month.28 Sony
confirmed that name, address, country, email address, birth date, logins
(usernames and associated passwords), and other data may have been obtained during the breach, and hinted at the possibility that credit card data was
also obtained in the attack.29 The breach affected over 75 million accounts
across the world.30 It appears likely that hacktivist group “Anonymous”
was involved in the attack.31 As of October 2012, class action litigation
23

Id. at A12 (explaining how TJX was using “a flawed encoding system called Wired
Equivalent Privacy, or WEP” at a time when “the wireless industry was offering a more
secured system called Wi-Fi Protected Access or WPA, with more complex encryption”).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
For example, one gang, “using bogus credit cards stolen from hundreds of TJX
customers ... bought $8 million worth of gift cards and used them to buy flat-screen TVs,
computers and other electronics.” Id.
27
See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7; see also Sonypictures.com
Data Security Incident, SONY PICTURES (June 8, 2011), http://www.sonypictures.com/corp
/consumeralert.html.
28
See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7 (notifying consumers
of the breach and the shutdown of the network between April 17th and 19th); Daniel Ionescu,
Green Light Is On—Sony PlayStation Network Returns in US, PCWORLD (May 15, 2011,
9:46 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/227917/green_light_is_on_sony_playstation
_network_returns_in_us.html.
29
See PSN News: Consumer Alerts, PLAYSTATION, supra note 7 (“While there is no
evidence at this time that credit card data was taken, we cannot rule out the possibility.”).
30
Emily Chung, PlayStation Data Breach Deemed in ‘Top 5 Ever,’ CBC NEWS (Apr. 27,
2011, 10:56 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/04/27/technology-playstation
-data-breach.html.
31
Nick Bilton, Sony Explains PlayStation Attack to Congress, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG
(May 4, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/sony-responds-to
-lawmakers-citing-large-scale-cyberattack/ (“Although Sony said [in a letter to Congressional Representative Mary Bono Mack] it did not know who was responsible for the
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does not look promising in terms of providing relief for the affected class
of PlayStation Network users.32
Unfortunately for Sony and its customers, the PlayStation Network was
not the only Sony asset that suffered a data breach in 2011. In June of 2011,
Sony Pictures Entertainment was attacked, compromising the personal information of approximately 37,500 individuals.33 This time, Sony was clear that
the stolen data did not contain “any credit card information, social security
numbers or driver license numbers.”34 Troubling, however, is the suggestion by the hackers themselves “that Sony had stored its users’ information, including passwords, in plain text, with no encryption whatsoever.”35
Both TXJ and Sony point out the danger consumers face when companies
fail to take the proper steps to secure networks holding their data. The Sony
breach in particular highlights the need for companies to plan their security
with the assumption that there will be a breach at some point in time. Companies need to keep sensitive consumer data stored in encrypted formats so
that if hackers do gain access, the data they obtain will be much harder for
them to use. TJX, on the other hand, shows just how much consumer data
can be exposed by a failure to keep up with evolving security standards.
II. SETTING SECURITY STANDARDS
It is important to understand that though Sony and TJX may have failed
to implement necessary data security measures, in our current system, they may
not be entirely to blame for that failure. This is because network and data security standards are mostly developed either by private organizations36 or
attacks, the letter said the company believed a group called Anonymous played a role, as
Sony found files on its servers that said ‘Anonymous’ and ‘We Are Legion.’”).
32
See Lucile Scott, Judge Dismisses Much of PlayStation Hacking Suit, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERVICE (2012), https://www.courthousenews.com/2012/10/19/51486.htm (discussing District Judge Anthony Battaglia’s dismissal of many of the class claims, including the
bailment claim, which was dismissed on the grounds that “plaintiffs freely admit, plaintiffs’
personal information was stolen as a result of a criminal intrusion of Sony’s Network”).
33
See SONY PICTURES, supra note 27.
34
Id.
35
Nick Bilton, New Questions as Sony Is Hacked Again, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (June 8,
2011, 7:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/new-questions-as-sony-is-hacked
-again/.
36
See Software Eng’g Inst., Carnegie Mellon, The CERT® Program FAQ, CERT,
http://www.cert.org/faq/cert_faq.html (last updated June 20, 2012) (“The CERT Program is
an organization devoted to ensuring that appropriate technology and systems management
practices are used to resist attacks on networked systems ....”); Payment Card Industry
(PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures, PCI
SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL 5 (Oct. 2010), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents
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by non-regulatory government agencies.37 Thus, companies (at least in most
fields)38 are not required to implement or even stay up to date with evolving
data security practices.39 To adequately protect consumers and avoid situations like Sony, TJX, and the hundreds of other data breaches that occur
each year, something must be done to motivate companies to pay attention
to and implement such standards within their own security plans.
This Note proposes a mixture of government, private, and consumer
cooperation to accomplish this goal. The result would give consumers the
power to hold accountable those companies that fail to properly secure
their personal information. First, we need uniform federal legislation that
incorporates the work of private organizations and non-regulatory government agencies in the data security field.40 Such legislation would be
self-updating by simply referring to the work of these organizations and
agencies as the requisite standard.41 Then, under a theory that companies
who implement lax data security measures are engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices,42 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could
police compliance with these standards.43 This does little, of course, to
/pci_dss_v2.pdf (“PCI DSS provides a baseline of technical and operational requirements
designed to protect cardholder data.”).
37
See Computer Security Division, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., http://nist
.gov/itl/csd/index.cfm (last updated Jan. 18, 2013) (“The Computer Security Division (CSD),
a component of NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), provides standards
and technology to protect information systems against threats to the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information and services.”). NIST is a non-regulatory
agency. NIST General Information, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., http://www
.nist.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm (last updated May 31, 2012).
38
See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
39
See Michael E. Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private
Sectors, 3 ISJLP 555, 570 (2008) (“Currently no relevant federal legislation concerning
data breaches involving private entities has passed Congress.”); Robert Sprague & Corey
Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying Information Through
Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 137 (2009) (“Though
nearly all the states have enacted data breach notification laws that promote data encryption,
companies are only obligated to notify individuals if their unencrypted PII [Personal Identifying Information] has been the subject of unauthorized disclosure.” (emphasis added)).
40
See infra Part III.
41
But see Abraham Shaw, Note, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention Using
PCI DSS, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 558–59 (2010) (proposing that
“legislatures should strive to codify the security principles embodied in PCI DSS, rather
than requiring specific technology, to avoid having to constantly update the law”).
Shaw’s argument fails to take into account that some attacks can only be prevented by
specific types or configurations of hardware and software. WPA wireless encryption, for
example, requires a hardware router that is capable of providing that level of encryption.
42
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also Shaw, supra note 41, at 538.
43
The FTC is already pursuing this theory but only after breaches occur. Shaw, supra
note 41, at 538–42.
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protect consumers who suffer when a company is breached before the
FTC detects its lax security measures. In such cases, consumers should be
able to refer to this robust legislation as the basis for a negligence per se
action against the company.
A. Existing State and Federal Efforts
Existing state efforts to combat the problem of data breach focus
overwhelmingly on notification.44 State notification laws require businesses “to publicly acknowledge data breaches, alerting affected parties to
take appropriate precautions.”45 Such laws only allow for civil action if a
consumer suffers injury because of a company’s failure to notify under the
statute, not for injury stemming from the underlying data breach.46 Many
states have used the notification statute adopted by California as a model
for their own notification law.47 As a result, most states follow California in
carving out an exception to the notification requirement, allowing breached
companies to avoid notifying affected consumers “when the lost data was encrypted (as opposed to plain-text) or to assist law enforcement.”48 Importantly, many states also follow California’s example in declaring waiver of
notification contrary to public policy and therefore void and unenforceable.49
This prevents consumers from unwittingly giving up their right to notification when entering into contractual relationships with companies.
At the federal level, there is currently no broadly applicable uniform
legislation that governs data security and notification.50 The statutes that do
exist only apply to specific situations or fields, such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in healthcare,51 or the GrammLeach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in the financial services industry.52 The GLBA,
as enhanced by the FTC’s “safeguard rule,”53 represents a step in the right
44

See Schneider, supra note 12, at 282 (“With data breach incidents on the rise, fortyfour states have enacted notification statutes.”).
45
Id.
46
Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 105; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b)
(West 2012).
47
Schneider, supra note 12, at 282–83.
48
Id. at 283.
49
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(a) (West 2012).
50
Shaw, supra note 41, at 534; see also Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 137
(“For non-financial web-based activities and transactions there are no direct legal restrictions on what companies can do with [Personal Identifying Information] they collect—
particularly the manner in which PII is stored.”).
51
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.312, 164.502 (2011).
52
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 16 U.S.C.).
53
See Shaw, supra note 41, at 537.
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direction because it requires financial institutions to secure customer information and notify customers in the event of a breach.54 Aside from being
applicable only to the financial services industry (and businesses dealing
with that industry), the GLBA as enhanced by the safeguard rule falls short
as an ideal uniform regulation because it fails to provide companies with
any concrete standards, such as particular hardware to install or particular
security protocols to employ, to ensure customer data is secure.
B. Sources of Security Standards
One place companies and other organizations could turn to for such
standards is the Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Information
Technology Laboratory (ITL).55 The CSD’s security research focuses on
“emerging technologies” and “new security solutions that will have a high
impact on the critical information infrastructure.”56 The CSD “[e]valuate[s]
security policies and technologies from the private sector and national security systems for Federal agency use” and compiles its research into “a
specification for minimum security requirements for Federal information
and information systems.”57 Naturally, the CSD’s work is primarily utilized by the federal government.58
Another source for computer security standards is Carnegie Mellon
University’s CERT program. CERT “is an organization devoted to ensuring
that appropriate technology and systems management practices are used to
resist attacks on networked systems.”59 The CERT program is federally
funded,60 and as a result, “the majority of [its] work contributes to government and national security efforts.”61 Importantly, however, CERT publishes many of its tools in an open source format, meaning any organization
can make use of or even improve upon CERT’s work.62 These tools include
methods for “discovering vulnerabilities, analyzing network traffic, and
54

Id.
See Computer Security Division, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra
note 37.
56
Systems & Emerging Technologies Security Research, COMPUTER SEC. DIV.,
COMPUTER SEC. RES. CTR., http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
57
About CSD, COMPUTER SEC. DIV., COMPUTER SEC. RES. CTR., http://csrc.nist.gov
/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
58
Id.
59
See Software Eng’g Inst., The CERT® Program FAQ, CERT, supra note 36.
60
See id.
61
Software Eng’g Inst., Carnegie Mellon, About Us, CERT, http://www.cert.org/meet
_cert (last updated Nov. 15, 2011).
62
Id.
55
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facilitating digital investigations,” allowing organizations to improve their
security by “identifying information security gaps, improving resilience,
and measuring susceptibility to insider threat.”63
The research conducted by organizations like the CSD and CERT is
invaluable in staying up-to-date with the fast moving target of computer
and network security. Legislative efforts like Gramm-Leach-Bliley need to
incorporate the work of these groups, so that organizations have some reference point for securing the data they hold, and so that enforcement efforts, such as those conducted by the FTC, have a framework for assessing
data security. A good example of what this kind of legislation might look
like can be found in the privately crafted “Payment Card Industry (PCI)
Data Security Standard.”64
C. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)
The PCI DSS is developed and updated by the PCI Security Standards
Council, an organization founded in 2006 by the major payment card
companies: American Express, Discover, JCB International, MasterCard,
and Visa.65 PCI DSS was “developed to encourage and enhance cardholder
data security and facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security measures globally. PCI DSS provides a baseline of technical and operational requirements to protect cardholder data.”66 The document “requires all retailers,
online merchants, data processors, and other businesses that handle credit
card information” to follow its security and assessment procedures.67
The “high-level overview” of the DSS outlines twelve requirements,
including “install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data” and “encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks.”68 Importantly, the document also tells participating entities how
to accomplish these requirements. For example, the use of WEP encryption
to secure wireless communications (the same encryption TJX had in place
when it suffered its data breach) is expressly prohibited by the PCI DSS.69
63

Id.
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 5.
65
About Us, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org
/organization_info/index.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
66
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36.
67
See Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1588.
68
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 20, 35.
69
Id. at 36.
64
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III. CODIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Perhaps because it is not mandatory,70 some scholars caution that the
PCI DSS is really an example of industry custom and “is a good test for
reasonable care only when industry practices do not create unreasonable
preventable dangers.”71 The concern here seems to be with the (at the
time) relatively undeveloped standards and best practices of the industry.72
As it stands today, however, the PCI DSS represents more than industry
custom. It stands as a model for the federal government to refer to in constructing comprehensive legislation, applicable to all companies and organizations that deal with consumer data. Such legislation would outline
both detailed technical requirements and general security principles73 that
are updated and informed by the work of agencies such as the CSD and
groups such as CERT.
A. Federal, Not State
From a consumer protection standpoint, it is important that data security
standards be set at the federal level, rather than by individual states. Arguments for state standards focus on the states’ traditional laboratory functions
and their history of leading the way in this area with notification laws.74 It
has been suggested that “state-created notification laws have effectively
created a race to the top,” with companies constructing their security plans
in accordance with the toughest state laws.75
These arguments fail to take into account that a race to the top for
companies creates a race to the bottom for those seeking to breach a company’s networks. Variations in state laws inevitably result in some states
with weaker standards. If a company primarily does business in a state
with weaker data security standards, it may wish to avoid the tougher requirements of states in which it does not conduct business, and satisfy only
the weaker standards. This naturally creates an incentive for hackers and
other cybercriminals to target companies in these weaker states. This
70

Compliance with the PCI DSS is voluntary and often encouraged through financial
and operational incentives or consequences put forth by the payment card companies. See
For Merchants, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org
/merchants/index.php (follow “What are the consequences to my business if I do not
comply with the PCI DSS?” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
71
Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1589.
72
See id.
73
See Jones, supra note 39, at 570.
74
See Shaw, supra note 41, at 550–52.
75
Id. at 550.
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would lead to a disproportionate number of data breaches affecting those
consumers unfortunate enough to do business with such companies, even
though the companies may be following the applicable laws.
Furthermore, companies and other organizations need clear guidance
on what exactly they need to do in order to secure consumer data, and
consumers need a clear benchmark for assessing whether they want to entrust those entities with their information.76 A uniform federal law would
satisfy both of those interests in a more efficient way than a myriad of
state standards.
B. Enforcement and Accountability
As mentioned above in Part II, one way companies are currently held
accountable for data breaches is through FTC enforcement actions.77 Generally, the FTC relies on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,78
a section that prohibits unfair and deceptive acts or practices.79 The cases
in which the FTC has employed this theory suggest that the FTC is concerned with at least five inadequate data security practices:
(1) inadequately assessing system vulnerability to commonly known or
reasonably foreseeable attacks;
(2) failing to apply low-cost, simple, and readily available defenses;
(3) using default user ID or passwords to protect sensitive data rather
than stronger passwords to prevent hackers;
(4) storing information in unencrypted files and sending sensitive data
via unencrypted transmission routes; and
(5) failing to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.80

Currently, the FTC brings an enforcement action alleging that the
breached company “failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security
for the consumer information stored on their network, including credit
card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.”81 Often, the company
76

But see id. (arguing that the perceived “race to the top” shows companies have had
no problem “navigating the maze of state laws to ensure compliance”).
77
See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text; Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39,
at 138–40.
78
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
79
See Shaw, supra note 41, at 538–42 (discussing current FTC enforcement efforts).
80
Id. at 542 (citing Joel B. Hanson, Note, Liability for Consumer Information Security
Breaches: Deconstructing FTC Complaints and Settlements, 4 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH.
11 (2008)).
81
Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 138 (citing Amended Consolidated Class
Action Complaint at para. 8, In re Life is Good, Inc. (F.T.C. 2007) (No. 072-3046), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723046/080117complaint.pdf).
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then signs a consent agreement in which it agrees to “establish and implement, and thereafter maintain a comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality,
and integrity of personal information collected from or about consumers.”82
As Robert Sprague and Corey Ciocchetti point out, “[t]he one element
missing in the FTC complaints and agreements are penalties for noncompliance.”83 Additionally, the discussion in Part II highlights that both
companies and consumers need more than nebulous directives to companies that they secure sensitive data. Both need concrete standards by which
to assess the strength of security implementations (or lack thereof).84
More importantly, enforcing data security standards only after a breach
is simply too late.85 The better approach, in terms of securing consumer
data, is to have the FTC monitor these companies for compliance with uniform federal data security standards before a breach occurs. Naturally,
however, there remains a gap where data breach can occur before the FTC
has detected non-compliance. It is at this point that consumers should also
be able to make use of uniform federal data security standards legislation
by bringing negligence per se actions against non-compliant companies.
IV. NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION
The idea of providing consumers with a negligence cause of action in
cases of data breach is relatively new. In 2005, Professors Michael L. Rustad
and Thomas H. Koenig proposed “a new tort of negligent enablement” directed at software venders that produce “defective products and services
that pave the way for third party cybercriminals who exploit known vulnerabilities.”86 Rustad and Koenig outlined all the traditional elements of a
negligence cause of action87 and even briefly discussed how their proposed tort would fit into a negligence per se framework.88 The negligence
per se cause of action proposed in this Part will proceed from Rustad and
Koening’s basic description of the elements and tailor those elements to
the kind of data breach described in Part I, while also incorporating the
proposed statutory backbone of Parts II and III.
82

Id. (citing Agreement Containing Consent Order at para. 3, In re Life is Good, Inc.
(F.T.C. 2007) (No. 072-3046), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723046/080117agreement.pdf).
83
Id. at 139.
84
See Shaw, supra note 41, at 550–52.
85
See Shaw, supra note 41, at 538.
86
Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1553.
87
See id. at 1586–1610.
88
See id. at 1592.
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A. Duty
At this point, the duty that should be required of businesses that deal
with sensitive consumer data should be clear. Similar to the existing duty
implicit in the FTC enforcement actions,89 businesses should have a legal
duty to take reasonable care to protect sensitive consumer information
from unauthorized access.90 As with the duty element of any negligence
cause of action, one concern here is with the term “reasonable care.”91
Since this Note seeks to ground the cause of action in a negligence per se
theory, clarifying the term “reasonable care” as it applies to a company’s
security policies and implementation is straightforward. Anything that
falls below the standards set by the kind of uniform federal legislation
called for in Parts II and III92 will fail to constitute reasonable care.
The more interesting problem, however, is one shared by all negligence causes of action. Just as some slips and falls are not reasonably
foreseeable, theoretically there is the possibility of a data breach that no
one could have reasonably predicted at the time. As Rustad and Koenig
correctly note, “[a]ny duty to protect computer users from the cybercrimes
of third persons must be predicated on a preventable risk.”93 This means
that businesses should not have a duty to guard against innovative breaches
that have no known or effective defense at the time of the attack.94 Here
89

See Shaw, supra note 41, at 542.
See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 239–40 (“We argue that companies
have a duty to provide reasonable information security practices under the common law of
torts.”); Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 140–41 (“Ultimately, companies must design,
implement, and maintain adequate security programs to protect PII.” (emphasis added)).
91
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines reasonable care “[a]s a test of liability for
negligence, the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line
of business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 240 (9th ed. 2009).
92
See supra Part II.A–B; see also infra Part IV.B for a discussion of how the material
discussed in Parts II and III can be synthesized into a workable statute upon which to
base a negligence per se cause of action.
93
Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1587; see also Rustad & Koenig, Extending,
supra note 4, at 251 (“The duty to implement security thwarting third-party cybercrimes
should turn on whether the crime was foreseeable.”).
94
The instances of such indefensible breaches are rare. This is likely due to the
overlapping nature of security systems. For example, in December of 2011, Columbia
researchers discovered a vulnerability in HP LaserJet printers that “could allow hackers
to remotely control printers over the internet.” Kevin Parrish, HP Issues Firmware to
Address Printer Vulnerability, TOM’S GUIDE (Dec. 28, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://
www.tomsguide.com/us/Columbia-University-HP-LaserJet-Printer-Exploit,news-13671.ht
ml. HP acknowledged the vulnerability but indicated that “no customer [had] reported
unauthorized access.” Id. This is likely due to the fact that a basic firewall (present in
virtually all home routers and requiring little to no user interaction to ensure protection)
would protect against the attack. Id.
90
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too, grounding this action in negligence per se affords some aid to both consumers seeking relief, and courts seeking to adjudicate post-data breach
claims. In addition to setting a security standards floor, constructing legislation centered on the work of agencies like the CSD and organizations
like CERT95 also provides a measure of what it means for an attack to be
innovative enough to fall outside the reasonableness standard. If an attack
is so new that not even computer security experts could have anticipated it,
absent further negligence on the part of the breached company,96 one should
be extremely hesitant in holding that company liable for the breach.97
More importantly, the notion that businesses only have a duty to guard
against foreseeable risks of data breach places a burden on consumers to
guard against breach as well. Consumers should take the time to evaluate
the security policies of the specific companies with which they do business online and understand good Internet security practices in general.98 In
the short term this may lessen the incidence of “phishing” attacks, in which
unwary users are lured into putting sensitive information (such as bank
login usernames and passwords) into fake sites posing as the legitimate site
the user is trying to access.99 For example, many sites use a form of Internet
security known as “Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure” (HTTPS).100 To put
it simply, HTTPS is a means of securing online communications between
95

See supra Part II.B.
For example, if a cybercriminal is able to make use of something like the
vulnerability in the HP printers in a corporate setting, a consumer would still have a
negligence cause of action under the theory proposed by this Note. The argument would
be that the company failed to properly configure their firewall to protect against the
possibility that other systems on their network (such as the flawed printer, or more likely, a
server housing consumer data) may be vulnerable.
97
This may seem unfair to consumers, as they are forced to bear the loss for something
no one could have foreseen. It may be a moot point however because, as indicated above,
such incidents should be incredibly rare. See supra Part II.B.
98
See Sprague & Ciocchetti, supra note 39, at 136 (“Consumers should possess at
least some of the responsibility for learning as much as they can about any website that
requires their PII submissions.”).
99
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines phishing as “[t]he sending of a fraudulent
electronic communication that appears to be a genuine message from a legitimate entity
or business for the purpose of inducing the recipient to disclose sensitive personal
information.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1263 (9th ed. 2009).
100
For an in-depth explanation, see Beginners Guide to SSL Certificates: Making the
Best Choice When Considering Your Online Security Options, VERISIGN (2010), http://www
.verisign.com/ssl/ssl-information-center/ssl-resources/guide-ssl-beginner.pdf. VeriSign,
now part of Symantec, makers of the popular Norton Antivirus, is a massive player in the
online security business, responsible for providing validation services for over 4.5 billion
daily hits. SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.com/ssl-certificates (follow “Advantages”
tab) (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
96
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a consumer’s Internet browser and a company’s website.101 If a hacker intercepts the communication, he or she will be hard-pressed to access the
information it contains.102 In that way, HTTPS is similar in concept to using
a code language that only you and a friend know to exchange traditional
paper correspondence. Consumers can easily identify websites that utilize
HTTPS by looking for a small padlock,103 or for part of the website’s name
to be highlighted in green.104 If a consumer knows their financial site is
supposed to utilize HTTPS, yet they do not see the padlock or green text, then
they will know that they are being targeted for a phishing scam. Alternatively, if the consumer knows the site they are on is legitimate, yet they do
not see any indication that the site utilizes HTTPS, then they know the site
is not secure and they should not communicate their sensitive information.
The burden on consumers to educate themselves and implement good
Internet security practices is not meant as a device for allowing businesses
to shrug off their duty of care. Quite the opposite, the burden on consumers
should provide greater incentive to businesses to discover risks and notify
consumers of them, so as to be able to make the argument that consumers
should have been aware of the danger.105 For example, should a company
discover that impersonating emails are being sent to consumers directing
them to fraudulent sites in an attempt to steal their information, the company should immediately send out an alert to all potential victims.106 If
after receiving this notice (and assuming no other negligence on the part of
the company), a consumer falls victim to the scam anyway, the company
should not be held liable for the consumer’s failure to do his or her own
part in securing their data.
101

Beginner’s Guide to SSL Certificates, VERISIGN, supra note 100, at 4.
See HTTPS, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/https (last visited
Feb. 2, 2013). The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit organization that
holds itself out as “confront[ing] cutting-edge issues defending free speech, privacy, innovation, and consumer rights today” in the online world. About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/about (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
103
Beginner’s Guide to SSL Certificates, VERISIGN, supra note 100, at 3.
104
Id.
105
At least one commentator sees this kind of increased incentive as a cause for concern. See Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private
Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 263–64 (2007) (“Even
if the result is economic waste, actors might adopt excessive, and perhaps inefficient,
precautions in a negligence regime in order to bolster their claim to have exercised due
care should litigation arise.”). This is exactly the kind of effort we want to encourage
because of the rapidly changing nature of technology and the diligence of cybercriminals.
106
For an example of this practice in the federal government, see Consumer Alerts,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/alerts/ (last updated
Jan. 30, 2013).
102
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At this point, it should be mentioned that the classic Hand formula107
is an inappropriate method to establish duty in this context.108 One fear
with the use of the Hand formula is that it would “deter businesses from
engaging in electronic commerce altogether.”109 Practically speaking, all
the Hand formula provides in this context is a dollar amount that companies should be spending on network security to avoid liability. Because of
the high potential for data breach110 and the likelihood of high resulting
damages,111 that figure may be more than even the wealthiest companies
could afford.112 Furthermore, the Hand formula provides no real guidance
to actually securing a network, beyond throwing as much money as possible at the problem.
B. Breach
As indicated throughout this Note, breach should be determined on a
negligence per se theory.113 Rustad and Koenig viewed negligence per se
as a possibility in creating their tort of negligent enablement of cybercrime
in the software context.114 They discuss three factors for determining
whether adopting a statute as the standard of care is appropriate: “(1) Does
the statute provide specific guidance on the standard of care? (2) Was the
107

See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (presenting the formula as B<PL where B equals “the burden of adequate precautions,” P equals
the probability of harm, and L equals “the gravity of the resulting injury”).
108
For a discussion of the Hand formula in the electronic security context, see Rustad &
Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 239–40 (arguing that “[t]he best analytical approach
for crafting this new duty involves determining whether the burden of a comprehensive
security solution is less than the magnitude of the damages caused by lost or stolen data,
multiplied by the probability of occurrence.”). But see Schneider, supra note 12, at 298–300
(“The usefulness of this formula in data breach cases depends on our ability to estimate its
variables properly.”).
109
Schneider, supra note 12, at 299–300 (fearing that “the Hand Formula would yield
the same result as imposing strict liability”).
110
See id. at 299 (“Nearly one in four Americans will have their data exposed each calendar year.” (citing Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, but Few Victims in Data Breaches, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/27/technology/circuits/27lost.html)).
111
See Schneider, supra note 12, at 299–300.
112
This explains Schneider’s fear of the Hand formula essentially imposing strict liability. See id. Since no one could ever afford to pay as much for data security as the Hand
formula would require, in virtually every case the company would be found negligent and
the cause of action would fail to guide or promote conduct in any meaningful way.
113
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
114
See Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1593–94 (“If statutes were enacted
specifying a given level of computer security, users could use the violation of that
statutory standard of care as a potent surrogate for negligence.”).
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statute enacted to protect against the harm suffered by the plaintiff? and
(3) Was the plaintiff included in the class protected by the statute?”115
Then, as now,116 “there [was] little by way of legislative guidance on
what constitutes reasonable security.”117 The PCI Security Standards Council
was in its infancy118 and the PCI DSS was just emerging as a model on which
to base the kind of legislation needed for a negligence per se cause of action.119
As seen in Parts II and III, the PCI DSS is now well-established.120 When
continually updated with research from the other organizations described in
Part II,121 and supplemented by the federal enforcement efforts described
in Part III,122 the legislation that emerges is exactly the kind of legislation
that meets Rustad and Koenig’s three criteria.123 Such legislation would
certainly provide guidance on the standard of care companies would need
to meet to guard consumer data; indeed, the PCI DSS as it exists now already provides exactly this sort of guidance.124 The statute could easily be
enacted to directly address the problem of data breach, as opposed to trying to fit the negligence per se action under some other statute such as
HIPPA or the GLBA.125 Finally, since the statute would outline what companies needed to do to secure consumer data, consumers would have no
trouble in successfully arguing that they were encompassed by the statute’s
protection. This provides support that a negligence per se action is sustainable under such a legislative regime. Under this theory, consumers could
establish breach by pointing to a company’s failure to comply with the
standards set forth in the adopted legislation.
115

Id. at 1593.
See supra Part II.B.
117
Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1593.
118
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
119
Version 1.1 of the PCI DSS was released in September of 2006. Payment Card Industry
(PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC.
STANDARDS COUNCIL, 1 (Sept. 2006), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/pci
_dss_v1-1.pdf; see also supra Part II.C. PETER SILVA, COMPLYING WITH PCI DSS 3–4 (2012),
available at http://www.f5.com/pdf/white-papers/complying-pci-dss-wp.pdf.
120
For example, according to a 2010 PCI DSS compliance study undertaken by Verizon,
out of 200 organizations assessed, 49 percent were at least 90 percent PCI DSS compliant.
Verizon 2010 Payment Card Industry Compliance Report, VERIZON 4, 7 (2010), available
at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-payment-card-industry -com
pliance-report_en_xg.pdf.
121
See supra Part II.B.
122
See supra Part III.
123
See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 239–40.
124
See Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard Requirements and Security
Assessment Procedures, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 36, at 5.
125
For the problems with using HIPPA or the GLBA as the basis for a negligence per
se cause of action, see Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1594–97.
116
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C. Causation
As with many negligence causes of action, the basic argument for causation in this context should be that, but for a company’s failure to comply
with the legislated standards and properly secure consumer data, the plaintiff’s data would not have been exposed, thereby causing injury to the
plaintiff.126 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 431 states that:
“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”127 As Rustad and
Koenig rightly point out, “[i]t may be difficult to determine whether a software bug, security hole, or a misconfiguration was a ‘substantial factor’ if
the security breach was connected to multiple potential causes.”128 Ideally,
this should be an issue for the finder of fact to resolve.129 The plaintiff in
this type of negligence per se data breach case should be able to begin by
pointing to a part of the defendant company’s (the company holding the
consumer’s data) security that failed to meet the legislative standards. The
burden should then be on the defendant company to provide a reason as to
why a third party in charge of that particular piece of software or security
component is really the one responsible for the flaw.130
D. Harm and Damages
As a result of the ethereal nature of data breaches, consumers do not
suffer the physical injuries that plague many unfortunate tort victims.131
126

For this argument in the software context, see Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra
note 5, at 1600–01 (“In a negligent enabling case, a plaintiff will need to demonstrate a
causal connection (cause-in-fact) between software defects and consequential or direct
damages suffered .... The ‘but-for’ test would determine ‘whether the defendant’s
conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s harm.’” (footnote omitted)).
127
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965); see also Rustad & Koenig, The
Tort, supra note 5, at 1601 (“The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted a ‘substantial
factor’ test that only requires that the defendant materially contribute to a computer
intrusion or internet security breach.”).
128
Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1601.
129
See id. at 1602 (“In a computer security case, the plaintiff must present facts and
circumstances that will convince a jury that the cybercrime that caused the plaintiff’s
injury was facilitated by the data handler or software vendor.”).
130
For an example of this argument in the context of HIPPA, see id. at 1595 (“Health
care providers punished for such unauthorized disclosures of individually identifiable
health information should be able to seek indemnification against a software vendor
whose products or services paved the way for the wrongful disclosure.”).
131
See Rustad & Koenig, The Tort, supra note 5, at 1603 (“The predominant injury in
a cybertort case will be a financial loss, dignitary injury, or invasion of privacy rather
than personal injury or death.”).
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The data breach victim suffers harm in the form of “increased risk of identity fraud, fear of identity fraud, and cost of efforts to reduce their risk of
identity fraud,” analogous to the toxic tort categories of “enhanced risk,
fear of future harm, and medical monitoring.”132 Arguments on these theories
of harm have failed to gain much traction in the courts.133 Enhanced risk is
hard for plaintiffs to prove as a matter of mathematical probability—the
correlation between information obtained from data breach and actual instances of identity theft is surprisingly low, comprising only 1.5% to 4%
of all identity theft reports.134 Fear of future harm falls into the category of
emotional harms courts have found “too speculative to confer standing.”135
Costs of efforts to reduce the risk of actual identity theft, generally in the
form of credit monitoring services,136 are seen as distinguishable from medical monitoring costs in toxic tort cases. Credit monitoring is seen as a preventive measure, to avoid future theft from intervening third-party use of
the stolen data, whereas medical monitoring costs are seen as efforts at
early diagnosis and treatment of a more likely medical harm.137 All of these
problems lead to conclusions like that of Judge Ripple in the Seventh Circuit
132

James Graves, “Medical” Monitoring for Non-Medical Harms: Evaluating the
Reasonable Necessity of Measures to Avoid Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2, 5–6 (2009).
133
See id.; Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264 (“No plaintiff has been
successful in receiving an award to compensate for lost data where identify theft has not
yet occurred.”).
134
See Schneider, supra note 12, at 288 (citing Steve Lohr, Surging Losses, but Few
Victims in Data Breaches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09
/27/technology/circuits/27lost.html).
135
Graves, supra note 132, at 6 (citing Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796–98
(M.D. La. 2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims, including fear and apprehension of fraud,
on the grounds they did not constitute recoverable damages)); Randolph v. ING Life Ins.
& Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs’ claim of
substantial risk of harm of identity theft failed to amount to more than speculation);
Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. Minn. 2006)
(granting defendant company’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to
articulate present injury); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. CIV. 05-668
RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *3–6 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding plaintiff’s claim
deficient for failing to provide evidence that data was ever held or used with intent to
commit unlawful activity).
136
See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 113 (2011) (“In this type of arrangement, a business reviews
information, generally on a daily basis, from one or more of the major credit-reporting
agencies. When a change in the data subject’s credit history occurs, such as the
unauthorized opening of a new account in the victim’s name, the service alerts the
[victim].”).
137
See Graves, supra note 132, at 28.

2013]

SECURE MY DATA OR PAY THE PRICE

237

case Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,138 that “[w]ithout more than allegations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs have not suffered a harm that the law is prepared to remedy.”139
There is no simple solution to this “present injury”140 barrier that data
breach plaintiffs face in pursuing their claims. In some sense, courts need
to come around to the idea that simply having your data in unauthorized
hands, outside of your control, is an injury that occurs entirely separate
from actual fraudulent transactions.141 While the readily measurable costs
of this injury may be small, in the form of credit monitoring costs (often
provided by the breached company anyway, in an effort to build goodwill
after a breach)142 and costs to secure replacement financial and identification cards such as driver’s licenses, there is also an emotional component
not captured in these costs. Plaintiffs deserve the recognition of the fact
that they now have to deal with the overhanging fear that they will transition from data breach victims to full-blown identity theft victims143 and
the fact that they were let down by a company they entrusted with their
sensitive data as a present, immediate, and compensable injury.
Assuming the present injury barrier can be overcome, plaintiffs face
another hurdle in the form of the Economic Loss Rule.144 In short, the
Economic Loss Rule operates to preclude recovery when the parties have a
138

Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 639.
140
See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264–66 (discussing the present
injury barrier as an obstacle plaintiffs face in pursuing their claims when data breach has
resulted in a loss of their data yet no actual identity theft has occurred).
141
See Johnson, supra note 136, at 141.
142
Id. at 125–28 (citing numerous examples of breached companies providing
anywhere from one to three years of free credit monitoring to affected consumers,
including Sony in the PlayStation breach discussed in Part I.B). Indeed, as a result of
increased incentive presented by the kind of suits proposed by this Note, virtually all
companies may come to automatically provide credit monitoring costs. This should not
preclude action however, because credit monitoring does nothing to ease consumer fear
of actual identity theft that may not appear on credit reports, such as opening accounts or
obtaining services that do not require a credit check. See Defend: Recover from Identity
Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/de
fend.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
143
Indeed, this overhanging fear is precisely why commentators analogize data breach victims to medical monitoring cases. See Rustad & Koenig, Extending, supra note 4, at 264–65
(“The victims of a widespread data theft such as the TJX case could form a ‘monitoring
class’ roughly paralleling consumers implanted with a defective medical device that has
not yet injured them.”).
144
Id. at 268 & n.139 (pointing out that even if the present injury barrier can be
overcome, “courts permit no recovery for purely economic losses” and that “plaintiffs
have not been successful in side-stepping the ELR in negligent data handling cases”).
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direct contractual relationship and damages are consequential (lost profits),
rather than direct (property damage or personal injury).145 As Vincent Johnson
persuasively argues, however:
In large measure, the economic loss rule is intended to further the private ordering of business transactions. However, data-security statutes
in many states hold that private agreements disclaiming legislatively
imposed obligations related to computerized personal information are
not enforceable and are void as against public policy. Consequently, the
duties at issue in cybersecurity cases are, in large measure, not a proper
subject for private ordering. For this reason ... the economic loss rule
should not foreclose recovery of credit-monitoring damages.146

Unfortunately, as Johnson points out, not all courts have adopted this view
in data breach cases.147
If, however, plaintiffs can successfully overcome both the present injury
and economic loss rules, their damages should not be limited merely to
recovery of credit monitoring costs148 and similar compensatory items.
Perhaps more importantly, punitive damages should also be available to
data breach plaintiffs. Data breach represents the perfect scenario for one
of the basic rationales behind punitive damages: incentivizing citizens to
bring suit when compensatory harm is relatively low but we, as a society,
still wish to punish the harmful activity.149 Additionally, punitive damages
would serve a function of tort law that is often left behind in modern jurisprudence: the public expression of outrage at the actions of the tortfeasor.150
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Id. at 267; see also Johnson, supra note 136, at 122.
Johnson, supra note 136, at 122–23 (footnotes omitted); see also Danielle Keats
Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1816 (2010) (“These
financial injuries have much in common with economic harm long redressed under other
branches of tort law.”).
147
Johnson, supra note 136, at 123 (citing Paul v. Providence Health System–Oregon,
240 P.3d 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that data breach plaintiffs could not recover
credit monitoring costs because they constituted purely economic damages)).
148
But see Graves, supra note 132, at 50–58 (arguing that an economic analysis
assuming even the most expensive costs of actual identity theft and the highest
probability of actual identity theft occurring suggests that it is not economically rational
to purchase credit monitoring in the case of data breach).
149
See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE
L.J. 347, 366–67 (2003).
150
See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409 (2009) (“Damages are designed
not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty,
to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury
to the action itself” (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99 (C.P. 1763))).
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CONCLUSION
As it stands today, consumer protection and relief after the fact from
data breach is woefully inadequate. Companies are left to their own devices
when it comes to securing sensitive consumer information, and as a result
they often create systems that practically beg to be exploited by savvy
hackers. The time is ripe for the federal government to step in and level
the playing field by carefully constructing standards that allow consumers
to have confidence that the companies with which they choose to do business are using reasonable and effective methods to secure their data.151
Should that confidence prove misplaced, however, and should companies
slip under the enforcement radar, consumers should not be left to bear the
cost. By allowing consumers to hold companies like Sony and TJX accountable for negligent data security practices, we add another layer of incentive for companies to meet their duty of care. Consumers should not be
denied access to courts merely because some unknown third party has not
used their data in a detrimental way. The fact is that when consumer data
is stolen, it is stolen from consumers, not the companies holding the data.
It is at that point that consumers have suffered an injury, and it is at that
point they should be allowed to hold responsible the company that made
that injury possible.
John A. Fisher*

151

Indeed, the government itself may also have national security incentives to step into
this arena. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of
Cyberattack on U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12
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